University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Marketing Papers

Wharton Faculty Research

9-2008

When Rational Sellers Face Nonrational Buyers: Evidence from
Herding on eBay
Uri Simonsohn
University of Pennsylvania

Dan Ariely

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/marketing_papers
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Business Intelligence
Commons, Cognition and Perception Commons, Cognitive Psychology Commons, Community
Psychology Commons, E-Commerce Commons, Marketing Commons, Organizational Behavior and
Theory Commons, Sales and Merchandising Commons, and the Social Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Simonsohn, U., & Ariely, D. (2008). When Rational Sellers Face Nonrational Buyers: Evidence from Herding
on eBay. Management Science, 54 (9), 1624-1637. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0881

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/marketing_papers/302
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

When Rational Sellers Face Nonrational Buyers: Evidence from Herding on eBay
Abstract
People often observe others' decisions before deciding themselves. Using eBay data for DVD auctions we
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that bidders herd into auctions with more existing bids, even if these are a signal of no-longer-available
lower starting prices rather than of higher quality. Bidders bidding a given dollar amount are less likely to
win low starting price auctions, and pay more for them when they do win. Experienced bidders are less
likely to bid on low starting price auctions. Remarkably, the seller side of the market is in equilibrium,
because expected revenues are nearly identical for high and low starting prices.

Keywords
herding, auctions, biases, rationality, industrial organization

Disciplines
Business | Business Administration, Management, and Operations | Business Intelligence | Cognition and
Perception | Cognitive Psychology | Community Psychology | E-Commerce | Marketing | Organizational
Behavior and Theory | Sales and Merchandising | Social Psychology

This technical report is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/marketing_papers/302

When Rational Sellers Face Non-Rational Buyers:
Evidence from Herding on eBay
Uri Simonsohn
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19104,
uws@wharton.upenn.edu
Dan Ariely
Sloan School of Management, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 02142, ariely@mit.edu

We document that eBay bidders exhibit a biased preference for auctions with more bids, even if these are non-diagnostic of
quality, creating an incentive for sellers to lower starting prices to attract early bids. We find that lowering starting prices
succeeds in increasing the likelihood that an auction will receive additional bids, conditioning on its current price. We also find
that, conditioning on dollar amount bid by bidders, those who engage in non-rational herding are less likely to win, and when
they do win they pay higher prices. Supporting the premise that this is a mistake, experience reduces dramatically the tendency
to engage in non-rational herding. Remarkably, the seller side of the market is in equilibrium: a high enough share of sellers
chooses low starting prices for expected revenues to be identical for high and low starting prices. In sum, market forces in eBay
eliminate the rents associated with exploiting the behavioral bias we identify, but not the bias itself.

Keywords: herding, auctions, biases, rationality, industrial organization.
____________________________________________________________________________________
1. Introduction
How do rational sellers respond to the non-rationality of the consumers they serve? A nascent
literature, often referred to as behavioral industrial organization, attempts to address precisely this
question. It contains a handful of empirical papers that provide explanations for otherwise puzzling firm
behavior based on a particular deviation from rationality on the part of the consumers these firms serve
(DellaVigna & Malmendier, 2006; Morgan & Hossain, 2006; Morton & Oster, 2003), and a couple of
theoretical papers that demonstrate that competition among firms can lead to the elimination of rents
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associated with exploiting a bias without eliminating the bias itself (DellaVigna & Malmendier, 2004;
Gabaix & Laibson, 2006).1
In this paper we contribute to this literature on both accounts. That is, we identify a specific bias
in how consumers make decisions that incentivizes an otherwise suboptimal strategy on the part of sellers,
and we demonstrate that enough sellers are exploiting the bias that in the margin they are indifferent
between exploiting and not exploiting it.
More specifically, using data from eBay auctions for DVD movies we show that bidders have a
tendency to choose auctions with more existing bids even when these do not provide useful information.
This bias creates an incentive for sellers to obtain early bids, which they can do by lowering the starting
price of their auctions. In our sample, for example, auctions starting at $1 accumulate 8.8 bids by the
time they reach $10, compared to just 2.7 bids by those starting at $9.
Although standard auction models (e.g. Milgrom & Weber, 1982; Myerson, 1981) propose that
sellers should not set the starting price of their auctions below the opportunity cost of the item they are
offering, if bidders prefer auctions with more bids it may be optimal for (some) sellers to do so. Indeed,
we find that additional bids obtained through lower starting prices are effective in obtaining additional
bids. For auctions currently at $10, for example, we find that 83% of those starting at $1 receive an
additional bid, compared to 60% of those starting at $10.
There is nothing surprising, of course, in bidders choosing to bid on auctions with low starting
prices while they still have a lower price, but there is with them continuing to prefer them once their
prices are no longer low. We believe that bidders’ non-rational tendency to prefer auctions with more
bids can explain the high prevalence of below-cost starting prices on eBay. In our sample of DVD
movies, for example, 22.1% of auctions started at $1 or less, clearly below their opportunity cost
considering that just 0.2% of auctions in the sample sold for less than $1.

1

For a survey of this latest and also previous attempts in Industrial Organization to incorporate bounded rationality
see (Ellison, Forthcoming).
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Although lowering the staring-price has the advantage of attracting early bids, as more and more
sellers do so, it becomes increasingly likely that the listed item will ultimately sell for a lower price. In
the extreme, if an infinite number of items were started at $1, all sold items would sell for $1.
In equilibrium, the expected revenue associated with a low and high starting price should be the
same (otherwise sellers would change the starting price of their auctions). We find evidence consistent
with the seller side of the market being in equilibrium (i.e. with an optimal number of sellers exploiting
this bias). The expected revenue associated with starting an auction at $1 is $9.260, virtually identical to
the $9.265 expected for a starting price of $10.
Although we find that market forces have eliminated the rents associated with exploiting the
identified bias, the bias itself survives. Indeed, the persistence of the bias explains why choosing a below
cost starting price is not a dominated strategy in equilibrium. Furthermore, consumers not only continue
engaging in non-rational herding after market forces have acted, they continue suffering the negative
consequences from doing so as they are, conditioning on the dollar amount of their bid, less likely to win
and when they do win they pay higher prices. For example, a bid for $10 on an auction that started at $1
has only a 16% chance of winning, while it has a 40% chance of winning an auction starting at $10.
Similarly, winners of auctions that start at $1 pay around 3% more than winners of auctions starting at
$10, again, conditioning on dollar amount bid.
The key assumption behind our interpretation of these findings as evidence of non-rational
herding is that starting price is not correlated with (unobservable) quality differences across auctions
and/or sellers. In section 5 we discuss in detail five arguments to support this assumption, among them:
(i) excluding observable heterogeneity from our analyses barely influences the estimated impact of
starting price, (ii) expected revenues for auctions with low and high starting price auctions are practically
identical; if low starting price auctions are of superior quality or are offered by superior sellers they
should collect more revenue, and (iii) experienced bidders are less likely to choose low starting price
auctions, conditioning on current price, suggesting that doing so is a mistake experience teaches bidders
to avoid.
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In addition to unobserved heterogeneity, we also rule out as alternative explanations the
possibility that our findings are driven by attachment (namely, early bidders increasing their willingness
to pay for the item they have already bid on) or by distracted snipers (i.e. last-minute bidders choosing
which auctions to bid on early during the auctioning process).
The paper contributes to various literatures. It is among the first to study herding utilizing
individual level data from the field, and the first to propose a specific testable (and tested) alternative to
rational information-based herding models that assume perfect Bayesian updating based on observed
behaviors. It also contributes to the auctions literature by providing an explanation for sellers’ marked
tendency to start their auction well below the opportunity cost of the items they offer. Finally, as
mentioned, it contributes to the developing field of behavioral industrial organization by both studying
how rational sellers respond to biased consumers and by demonstrating the survivability of biases to
market forces.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way: section 2 reviews the existing
literature and puts forward four predictions, section 3 describes the data, section 4 presents the empirical
results which we interpret as supporting the proposition that bidders engage in non-rational herding and
that sellers are best-responding to such bias, section 5 discusses alternative explanations for our results
and section 6 concludes.
2. Herding in auctions
People often observe the decisions of others before making a decision of their own. If these
observed decisions reveal valuable information, it may be optimal for observers to imitate them, engaging
in information-driven herding (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992). A common
example of this type of social learning consists of choosing busier restaurants, implicitly assuming that
previous choosers had private information about them. 2

2

Of course people may engage in herding for non-information related reasons including network externalities (Katz
& Shapiro, 1985), social sanctioning of deviants (Akerlof, 1980) and taste for conformity (Becker, 1991). None of
these factors are likely to influence how people choose auctions and hence throughout this paper we will always
refer to information driven herding.
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In order for information-based herding to be rational, observers must make correct attributional
inferences about the behaviors they observe. In particular, they must make unbiased estimates of the
private information held by prior decision makers. Abundant research from psychology, however,
suggests that people fall prey to systematic biases when making attributions about causality. Beginning
with Heider (1958), psychologists have proposed that when people observe actions that can be attributed
to multiple causes, they overattribute causality to focal ones (e.g. those they are assessing or that are
perceptually salient), and underattribute it to non-focal ones.
A classical experiment by Jones & Harris (1967), for example, showed that people’s inferences
about the political views of a speaker were influenced by the topic of the speech (focal) but not by
whether or not the topic had been assigned or chosen (non-focal). Another well known study is that of
Schwarz & Clore (1983). They found that people reported higher overall life satisfaction on sunnier days,
presumably because they failed to attribute to the weather their current mood. Taylor and Fiske (1975)
had eight different subject observing the same conversation between two people from different angles.
Subjects judged the person they were facing directly (the focal target) as having had a more central role in
the conversation. For a review of the psychology literature on misattribution of causality behind observed
behaviors see (Gilbert & Malone, 1995).
Returning to the issue of herding, if people overestimate the importance of focal causes, they will
tend to make systematically erroneous inferences about the private information held by previous decision
makers in a sequential choice setting. In particular, observers will tend to overestimate how good their
focal attribute is for the most commonly chosen alternative, leading to non-rational herding, i.e. to
herding driven by misinterpreted information.
For example, imagine two bars, only one of which offers a happy-hour promotion, attracting a
larger number of costumers early in the evening. After the happy-hour is over, new costumers deciding
between the two bars are likely to underestimate the importance the non-focal attribute (happy-hour
prices) had on earlier decision makers. Doing so would lead observers to incorrectly believe that the
crowd in the more popular bar is a signal of quality when in reality it is a signal of formerly lower prices.
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Auctions are ideal for studying non-rational herding because an auction’s starting price can,
completely independently of the auctioned item’s actual quality, influence the number of existing bids the
auction will have by the time it reaches a certain price. A bidder choosing between auctions with the
same current price faces a situation analogous to a customer choosing whether to enter a bar with a
recently expired happy-hour: popularity is a signal of no longer available low prices rather than of
enduring higher quality.
If bidders attribute causality the way subjects in psychology experiments do, they will
underappreciate the role that starting price had on number of existing bids (since it is not focal) and be
more likely to choose, from auctions with the same current price, the one with the lowest starting price. 3
This leads us to our first prediction,
Prediction 1: Conditioning on current price, low starting price auctions are more likely to receive
additional bids.
Although previous research has shown that low starting price auctions receive more bids that high
starting price ones (see e.g. Bajari & Hortacsu, 2003; Haubl & Popkowski Leszczyc, 2003b; Morgan &
Hossain, 2006), a distinction has not been made as to whether these additional bids are for amounts above
or below the higher starting price. Setting a low starting price mechanically increases the number of bids
placed below the high starting price because of the simple truncation effect of the starting price; bids for
low dollar amounts cannot be placed on high starting price auctions. Prediction 1 states that setting a
lower starting price will also increase the number of bids placed above the higher starting price, because
late bidders herd behind the otherwise truncated away low value bids.
Another reason why auctions are ideal for studying non-rational herding is that bidders have an
incentive not to herd, because the probability that they win the item they bid on, and the price they expect
to pay for it, depend on the behavior of other bidders. Herding should, on average, hurt bidders who
engage in it for at least two reasons. First, by choosing low starting price auctions bidders are choosing

3

Information about an auction starting price is available to bidders, but, unlike current price and number of existing
bids, it is not displayed unless bidders request it (with a single click).
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auctions which are more likely to receive future bids. Secondly, choosing an auction with more existing
bids increases the chances that a bid has already been placed for an amount above the current price. This
leads us to two related predictions:
Prediction 2a: A bid of a given dollar amount is less likely to be a winning bid on a low starting price
auction than on a high starting price one,
and
Prediction 2b: Winners of low starting price auctions will, conditioning on the dollar amount of their
bid, pay higher prices than winners of high starting price auctions,

If sellers can increase their revenues by simply lowering the starting price of their auction, we
would expect them to do so. Doing so increases the chances that they (and all other low starting price
sellers) actually sell for a lower final price. In equilibrium there should be enough low starting price
auctions that the marginal seller is indifferent between a high and a low starting price,
Prediction 3: Sellers’ expected revenue from setting a low and a high starting price is the same.
After describing the dataset in the next section, we test these predictions in section 4.
3. Description of the Data
The dataset
The data was provided to us directly by eBay. It consists of auctions for DVD movies taking
place during October 2002. We chose to study DVDs (a commodity) in order to reduce to a minimum
unobserved heterogeneity across goods with different starting prices. The dataset consists of auctions for
movie titles that were top-30 bestsellers in dvdmojo.com in September of 2002 or July of 2001. Six of
these 60 titles had either too few observations or had titles that were easily confused with other movies
and were hence dropped from the sample.4

4

eBay does not use unique product identifiers so the identity of items being auctioned must be inferred from sellers’
descriptions.
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We excluded auctions with starting price above $10.49 primarily because some of our analyses
control for starting price through dummies for each rounded amount (less than 4% of the sample had
starting prices above that figure). We also excluded auctions with a reserve price and those offering the
“buy-it-now” option (1% and 13% of the sample respectively). The “buy it now option” is a feature
which essentially converts an auction into a fixed price item. The qualitative nature of our results remains
unchanged if we do not impose these restrictions. After these exclusions the sample contains 54 movie
titles for a total of 8,333 auctions, posted by 2,481 different sellers and receiving 37,535 bids,
Variables
For each auction we know the starting price, the final price, the seller’s description of the item,
the identity of the seller, their reputation (net number of positive evaluations they have received in
previous transactions), whether they are an eBay store (if they have established a contractual relationship
with eBay) and the total number of DVDs they have offered on eBay since January of 2002. Based on the
description of the item by the seller we also created a dummy variable, new, which takes the value of 1 if
the seller described the item as ‘new’, ‘wrapped’ or ‘sealed’, and 0 otherwise. Surprisingly, eBay
collects shipping fees information only for items paid through their internal payment system and hence
28% of the data does not contain information on shipping charges. Controlling for shipping, therefore,
reduces sample size.
For each bid we know the dollar amount of the bid, how many minutes were left when the bid
was placed, the reputation of the bidder (analogous to the sellers’) and the price the bidder faced when she
placed her bid; we will refer to this price as current price throughout the paper. 5 Note that current price
seldom corresponds to the highest bid placed on the auction so far, since these values are only revealed
once outbid; current price equals either the second highest bid so far or the starting price if only one bid
has been placed.

5

Bidders submit bid amounts which correspond to the maximum they are willing to pay. eBay then automatically
places bids for them, outbidding existing bids only by the minimally required increment. Our data consists of the
actual maxima, not the proxy bids placed by eBay’s automatic bidding system.
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The dataset does not include bidders’ identifiers; to determine whether a bid belongs to a new
bidder or to a bidder who has already participated in that auction, we rely on the bidder’s reputation. Bids
coming into the same auction from different bidders who happen to have the exact same reputation will
therefore be coded as if they were placed by the same bidder. Given the relative low number of bidders
per auction and the large range of reputation, it is unlikely that we are incorrectly identifying a large
number of bidders.
Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1a shows the distribution of (rounded) starting prices in our sample. It shows large
dispersion in the starting prices chosen by sellers. Contrary to standard auction models, a large portion of
sellers set a starting price that is clearly below the cost of the item being auctioned. For example, 22.3%
of auctions start at $1 or less, clearly below the opportunity costs of popular DVD movies (only 0.2% of
auctions sell for such low final prices).
Overall 78% of auctions resulted in a sale, figure 1b plots the probability of sale by (rounded)
starting price; it shows that practically all movies with a starting price below $4 are sold, and that
probability of sale decreases as starting prices increase above $4. Excluding non-sold items, the average
auction received 5.5 bids. The average price of sold auctions was $10.29, and the average shipping
charges were $3.53.
*** Figures 1a and 1b ***
Finally, Figure 2 shows the distribution of final prices for auctions starting at $1 and $10. The
figure shows that auctions starting at $1 are more likely to obtain final prices below $10 than auctions
starting at $10, of course, but they are also more likely to obtain final prices above $10, the expected
losses and gains respectively. This highlights the aforementioned trade-offs involved in lowering a
starting price: increase in the chance of a high price but also of a low price.
*** Figure 2 ***
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4 Empirical Analyses
This section begins by documenting a correlation between the number of existing bids on an
auction and the number of additional bids it receives. It then demonstrates that this tendency to follow
existing bids persists even when it is entirely driven by lower starting prices. Then predictions 1, 2a and
2b are tested, followed by an assessment of the role of bidder experience. Finally, the expected revenues
associated with low and high starting prices are examined, finding support for prediction 3: in the margin
exploiting non-rational herding is as profitable as not exploiting it.
Existing bids predict future bids.
Although in this paper we are interested in variation in number of existing bids that results only
from variation in starting price, before presenting the analyses of the impact of starting price it is useful to
assess whether number of existing bids, caused by starting price or by any other factor, is a predictor of
future bids. This introductory analysis suffers from the usual identification problems afflicting empirical
work on peer-effects: the correlation between past and future choices could be caused by omitted
variables (for example auctions that happen to end on a rainy afternoon may have more existing and
forthcoming bids). Nevertheless, it would be hard to argue that starting price influences consumer
choices by affecting the number of existing bids, if these were not a significant predictor by themselves. 6
Before assessing the impact of starting price, therefore, we begin by documenting that the number of
existing bids is a significant predictor of the likelihood that an auction will receive additional bids.
To this end we estimated a regression where bids are the unit of observation, the dependent
variable takes the value of 1 if at least one more bid is placed on the auction and 0 otherwise. The key
predictor is how many bids have already been placed in the auction, controlling for current price, minutes
left in the auction and various other controls.
The results from this regression are consistent with the notion that auctions with more existing
bids are more likely to obtain more additional bids. The point estimate for log(existing bids) is β=1.52,

6

One interpretation of our analyses that focus on starting price is that we are instrumenting for number of existing
bids with an auction’s starting price.
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with a SE=.039. The full regression is presented in Column 1 of Table 1 (this table is discussed in detail a
few paragraphs below).
Again, it is quite clear that this result does not provide unambiguous evidence of herding. The
correlation we find could be the result of an omitted variable causing both the existing and the new bids.
It does, nevertheless, lend plausibility to our explanation that starting prices influence an auction’s
outcome by influencing the number of existing bids bidders observe when they arrive at an auction.7 We
now move on to our main analyses which focus on starting prices.
Early bidding, a necessary condition for herding
For late bidders to herd behind early bidders there must be early bidders to follow; if in the
extreme, all bids were placed in the last minute, herding would not be a plausible explanation for potential
differences in the performance of low and high starting price auctions. Figure 3a plots both the average
dollar amount of first bids and the number of hours left until the end of the auction when they were
placed. The figure shows that low starting price auctions receive bids much earlier than auction with high
starting prices: the average auction starting at $1 received the first bid around 5 days before the end of the
auction, compared to 8 hours for auctions starting at $10. Figure 3a also illustrates that early bids are for
lower dollar amounts, the first bid in auctions that start at $1 is, on average, for just $2.
*** Figures 3a & 3b ***
Since low starting price auctions receive low value bids early-on, by the time they catch-up with
higher starting price ones they are likely to accumulate a much larger number of bids than auctions that
started higher. Figure 3b plots the average number of bids received by the time auctions with different
starting prices reached a price of $10. As expected, auctions with lower starting prices receive a much
larger number of bids by the time they reach $10.
Since low starting price auctions receive bids early-on and accumulate a number of them by the
time they catch up in price, the non-rational herding mechanism we propose is a plausible explanation for
7

Dholakia and Soltysinski (2001) also propose that existing bids are correlated with new bids. They do not appear
interested, however, in disentangling between a causal and a spurious correlation, or on how the market responds to
such correlation.
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potential differences in performance by low and high starting price auctions. Figures 3a and 3b are not
evidence of herding, but of the necessary conditions for herding to occur.
Choosing Auctions – Testing Prediction 1
Prediction 1 states that, conditional on current price, lower starting price auctions are more likely
to receive additional bids. We test prediction 1 with two closely related analyses. The first consists of
pairwise comparisons of the probability of receiving an additional bid for auctions that started at $1 and
achieved a price of $6, $7, $8, $9 and $10, and the analogous probability for auctions that started at those
prices. We also estimated regressions that use the whole dataset and control for current price.
Pair-wise comparisons of auctions at the same current price
Figure 4 reports pairwise comparisons of the probability that an auction at a given current price,
$x, will receive at least one additional bid, for auctions that started at $x and those that started at $1.
Figure 4a shows the relative frequencies in the raw data (i.e. without any controls) while Figure 4b the
predicted probabilities arising from logistic regressions, controlling for movie and seller observable
heterogeneity.
The results presented in Figure 4 are consistent with prediction 1: conditioning on current price,
low starting price auctions are more likely to receive additional bids. For example, Figure 4a shows that
91% of auctions starting at $1 and currently at $8 receive an additional bid, while only 76% of auction
that start at $8 receive any bids. Figure 4b shows that once movie and seller characteristics are controlled
for, the predicted probabilities are 90% and 77% respectively, almost identical.
***Figure 4 ***
Logistic regression including all auctions in the sample
To extend the previous analysis to all observations in the dataset, we estimated a logistic
regression where every bid in the sample is an observation and the dependent variable takes the value of 1
if there was at least one more bid placed after it, and 0 otherwise (e.g. if an auction had three bids, the
dependent variable is 1 for the first two bids, and 0 for the third). The results are presented on columns
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2-6 of Table 1 (column 1 reports the previously discussed regression where number of existing bids is the
key predictor).
*** Table 1 ***
It is obviously important to control for current price since only low starting price auctions were
ever at a low current price, and auctions at current lower prices are more likely to receive additional bids.
In order to avoid imposing an arbitrary functional form on this key control variable, we use 21 dummies
(between $0 and $20) for the rounded dollar amount of the current price of the auction. This reduces the
likelihood of starting price being a significant predictor of probability of receiving bids because current
price is not adequately controlled for. Given than many auctions have multiple bids, standard errors are
clustered by auction (with the exception of column 5 where there are too few observations per auction for
the clustered standard errors to be computed).
Column 2 presents the baseline specification, column 3 adds controls for movie characteristics
(movie title fixed effects and the “new” dummy) and column 4 adds seller controls (experience,
reputation and the store dummy). As predicted, the coefficient of starting price is negative and significant
across all specifications: auctions with lower starting prices are more likely to receive additional bids
conditioning on current price. The parameter estimate for starting price is practically unaffected by the
inclusion of observable heterogeneity, this suggests that unobserved heterogeneity is an unlikely
alternative explanation. 8
To further rule out the possibility that the significant influence of starting price reported in
columns 2-4 is driven by the fact that only low starting price auctions were ever at low prices, column 5
reports the results from a regression run on the subset of observations when current price was at or above
$10. Starting price remains negative and highly significant. The drop in the size of the parameter is not
easily interpretable, for it refers to the average effect over a different range of current prices. Column 6
will be discussed in the alternative explanations section. In sum, both the pairwise comparisons and the
regression analyses of all bids find evidence consistent with prediction 1.
8

If current price is controlled for with a linear term, similar results are obtained (β=-0.171; SE=0.005).

13

Winning Auctions – Testing Prediction 2a
Prediction 2a indicates that bids for a given dollar amount are less likely to win auctions with
lower starting prices. This means that a bidder willing to bid a certain amount of money for a given
movie is more likely to win it if the bid is placed on a higher starting price auction. Two forces are
behind this prediction: the first is that choosing low starting price auctions means choosing auctions
which future bidders are likely to choose, and the second is that choosing an auction with existing bids
increases the chances that a bid that has already been placed (but whose maximum dollar amount is
hidden) is higher than the currently displayed price. As was the case with prediction 1, we begin with a
simple test on a subset of the data and we then extend the analysis to the whole dataset.
Comparison of $10 bids across auctions
Figure 5 plots the probability that a $10 bid wins an auction as a function of the starting price of
the auction where it is placed both controlling and not controlling for movie and seller variables. The
probability estimates without controls correspond to the relative frequency in the raw data. For example,
there were 1,277 $10 bids placed on auctions with a starting price of $1, of which 206 ended up winning
the auction, hence the probability that an observed $10 bid wins an auction starting at $1 is
206/1,277=16.1%.

9

The calculations with controls were obtained with a linear probability model where we included
dummies for each starting price and controlled for both movie and seller characteristics; the reported
probabilities correspond to the parameter estimates of each starting price dummy variable, plus a constant
that facilitates comparisons.
The results presented on Figure 5 are consistent with prediction 2a. Bids of a given dollar amount
($10) are more likely to win higher rather than lower starting price auctions. For example, a $10 bid had
a 16% chance of winning an auction that started at $1, but it had a 41% chance of winning an auction that

9

Note that we are looking at the actual relative frequency of bids for a certain dollar amount winning auctions,
rather than at whether a bid would have won had it been placed. The latter is a problematic counterfactual since it
assumes that placing a bid on an auction does not influence the behavior of other bidders, which is precisely the
question we address in this paper.
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started at $10. The similarity of both lines suggests heterogeneity across auctions with different starting
prices is not what’s behind the relationship between probability of winning an auction and starting price.
At face value these results mean that a bidder who is willing to pay up to $10 for a specific DVD
movie would increase her chances of winning it from 16% to 41% by placing her bid in an auction that
started at $10 rather than at $1.
*** Figure 5 ***
Logistic regression including all bids in the sample
To conduct a more comprehensive test we run a regression where each bid is an observation, the
dependent variable is whether the bid won the auction, and the key predictor is the starting price of the
auction. As was the case for prediction 1, standard errors are clustered by auction.
It is of high importance to control for the dollar amount of the bid being placed, since only low
starting price auctions can receive bids for low dollar amount, and such bids are less likely to win
auctions. As we did with current price when testing prediction 1, we control for the dollar amount of the
bid with dummy variables for each rounded dollar between $0 and $20, avoiding the need to impose an
arbitrary functional form on our key control variable.
The results of these regressions are presented in Table 2. Column 1 controls for auction
characteristics and for the number of minutes left when the bid was placed, column 2 adds movie controls
and column 3 seller controls. The coefficient of starting price is positive and greatly significant across all
specifications. Comparing the parameter estimates for starting price across columns 1-3 we see that, as
was the case for prediction 1, including observable heterogeneity does not diminish the estimated
influence of starting price, suggesting that unobserved heterogeneity is an unlikely alternative
explanation.

10

*** Table 3 ***
To further rule out the possibility that coefficient estimates for starting price from columns 1-3
are driven by the fact that only low starting price receive low value bids, Column 4 restricts the analysis
10

Controlling for current price linearly leads to a similar point estimate for starting price (β=.0882, SE=.0049).
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to bids for $10 or more. The coefficient for starting price is still positive and highly significant. The
change in size of the coefficient is not easy to interpret because it refers to the average effect over a
different range of bid amounts.
Price paid by winner, conditional on bid amount – Prediction 2b
Prediction 2b indicates that winners of low starting price auctions will pay higher prices for the
auctions they win, conditional on the amount they bid. To test for prediction 2b we estimated a regression
where each winning bid is an observation, the dependent variable is the price paid by the winner of the
auction, the key predictor is the starting price of the auction and the key controls are the current price at
the time the bid was place, and the dollar amount of the bid. The results are presented in Table 3.11
***Table 3***
Column 1 in Table 3 presents the regression estimates controlling only for dollar amount of bid,
minute left in auction when bid was placed and current price when bid was placed. Column 2 adds movie
controls, columns 3 seller controls, and column 4 shipping. Across all four columns the point estimate for
starting price is, consistent with prediction 2b, negative and significant: conditioning on the amount of the
bid, winners of lower starting price auctions pay higher prices. As was the case with predictions 1 and 2,
introducing observable heterogeneity barely influences the point estimate of starting price.
The effect size is small, specially compared to those resulting from predictions 1 and 2a.
According to the point estimates from column 4, winners of auctions starting at $10 pay 30 cents less, on
average, than winners of auctions starting at $0, (again, conditional on bid amount), that’s about 3% of
the final price. It would be difficult to obtain larger effect sizes in this sample, however, considering that
eBay’s required minimum increment is just 50 cents (in this price range).

11

The regression obtains such a high R2 probably because it controls both for the dollar amount of the winning bid
and the price at which the bid was placed.
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The role of bidder experience
If the behavior of bidders that leads to the previous findings is a mistake, as we posit, then bidders
may learn not to interpret bids that result from lower starting prices as informative and hence avoid low
starting price auctions once they catch up in price with higher starting price ones.
We do not have data on bidder experience per-se, but we do know bidders’ ratings, which consist
of the net number of evaluations bidders have received from sellers they have purchased from. Sellers
can evaluate buyers with a positive (+1), negative (-1) or neutral score (0); the variable we have consists
of the sum of all of these scores. Although bidder rating is not perfectly correlated with experience it is
probably a good proxy for it. There is ample variation in the ratings of bidders in the sample. For
example, the average rating in the lowest decile is 1.27, compared to 651.3 for bidders in the highest
decile.
To intuitively assess the role of experience, we compared the auctions bidders with different
amounts of experience chose to bid on. In particular, we concentrated on bidders placing a bid on
auctions currently at $10, and compared the share of these auctions that had a starting price of $1 and of
$10 for bidders across different experience levels. The results are presented in Figure 6.
The figure shows, for example, that (of auctions currently at $10) bidders in the lowest decile of
experience placed 32% of bids on auctions that started at $1, compared to 52% by bidders in the highest
decile of experience. The slopes in the graph indicate that bidders with more experience are more likely
to choose auctions with a starting price of $10, and less likely to choose auctions with a starting price of
$1, conditioning on the current price.
**Figure 6**
We also estimated a regression where each bid is an observation, the dependent variable is the log
of the rating of the bidder placing the bid, and the key predictor is the auction’s starting price. We control
for all observables, including dummy variables for the current price of the auction at the time the bid was
placed. If bidders with more experience tend to choose auctions with higher starting prices the coefficient
of starting price on the rating of bidders should be positive. As predicted, the point estimate of the
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relationship between starting price and buyer rating of the bidder placing the bid is positive and
significant, β=.020, SE = .003.
It is worth noting that although both Figure 6 and this regression present evidence consistent with
experienced bidders preferring higher starting price auction, given the cross-sectional nature of the data,
we cannot distinguish between a learning explanation, where bidders learn not to bid on low starting price
auction, and a selection one, where bidders who chose low starting price auctions are less likely to come
back to eBay.
Are sellers best-responding to the herding behavior of bidders?- Prediction 3
Sellers seem to at least partially recognize bidders’ non-rational herding, since a substantial
proportion of auctions start at prices well below the cost of popular DVDs, contrary to standard auction
model predictions. 22.3% of auctions start at $1 or less, well below the opportunity cost of popular DVD
movies (only 0.2% of auctions sell for $1 or less). An interesting question is whether 22% is the
equilibrium percentage of auctions starting at $1, i.e. whether a marginal seller could increase her
expected revenue by lowering the starting price of her auctions.
There is a tradeoff involved in lowering an auction’s starting price. Although it attracts low
value bids which in turn may attract more bids, if no high dollar amount bid is placed, then rather than
keeping the item, the seller has to sell it for a low price. In the extreme, if an infinite number of sellers
listed DVD movies for $1 on eBay, all sold movies would go for just $1. In equilibrium the number of
sellers setting low prices should be such that the expected revenue associated with starting at high and
low prices was the same. This tradeoff between potential gains and losses was highlighted above in
Figure 2, which shows the distribution of final prices for auctions starting at $1 and $10.
To test whether the seller side of the market is in equilibrium, i.e. if in the margin these two
forces cancel each other out, one needs to compare the expected revenues associated with low and high
starting prices. Revenues differ from prices because eBay charges listing fees which, as we shall see, will
be (indirectly) affected by starting prices as well.
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To compute expected revenues one needs to make assumptions about what sellers do with unsold
items. Considering that if sellers had an alternative to listing on eBay that lead to higher expected
revenues they would have not listed their item on eBay in the first place, we assume that unsold items are
re-listed, for the same starting price, until they eventually sell.
Sellers pay a listing fee for each item they post on eBay, regardless of whether the item sells. If
an item does not sell, however, sellers get one second listing for free; if on a second instance the item
does not sell, the seller must pay for each listing after that. So if an item is listed either once or twice
before selling, the seller pays the listing fee once ($.35), but if the item is listed three or more times before
it sells, the sellers pays $.35 multiplied by the number of times the item was listed, minus one.
The average final prices for auctions starting at $1 and $10, the two most popular starting prices,
controlling for all observables, are $9.61 and $9.71 respectively, i.e. auctions starting at $10 sell for
around $.10 more than auctions starting at $1. 12 Auctions starting at $10, however, need to be listed more
times, on average, before they are sold, because their probability of sale is so much lower (see figure 1b).
Once we subtract the corresponding expected costs in listing fees, expected revenues for auctions starting
at $1 and $10 are $9.260 and of $9.265 respectively. This suggests that, at least with respect to the
starting price decision, the seller side of the market is in equilibrium; the gains a seller obtains in terms of
increasing the chances of a higher final price are exactly cancelled out by the losses associated with the
now possible lower final prices.

13

This highlights an important point we make in this paper. Market forces have eliminated the
rents associated with exploiting non-rational herding (i.e. with setting a low starting price) but they have

12

These are the sum of the intercept plus the parameter estimates from starting price dummies in a regression where
each sold auction is an observation, and both movie and seller observables are controls.
13
Several papers have investigated the correlation between starting and final prices, obtaining mixed results. Some
find a negative association (Kamins, Dreze, & Folkes, 2004; Ku, Galinsky, & Murnighan, in press.; Reiley, 2005),
while others find a positive one (Brint, 2003; Haubl & Popkowski Leszczyc, 2003b; Lucking-Reiley, Bryan, Naghi,
& Reeves, 2000; Park & Bradlow, 2004). These papers have many differences which are beyond the scope of this
paper to discuss in detail. The most important differences between our paper and most previous ones are that (i) we
concentrate on expected revenues rather than prices (taking into account fees and probability of sale) (ii) we
compare the expected revenues for the two most commonly chosen starting prices, rather than arbitrarily “high” and
“low” ones, and (iii) we used data from auctions for a commodity where unobserved heterogeneity (real or
perceived) is trivial.
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not eliminated non-rational herding per-se. Indeed setting a starting price of $1 is not dominated by a
starting price of $10 because bidders continue to engage in non-rational herding.
5 Alternative Explanations
Our interpretation of the evidence presented above is that bidders engage in non-rational herding
choosing auctions with lower starting prices because they have accumulated more bids by the time they
catch up in price with higher starting price ones. In this section we entertain three alternative
explanations. These are: (i) low starting price auctions are unobservably superior to high starting price
ones, (ii) bidders become attached to auctions they have already placed bids on, and (iii) last-minute
bidders choose auctions when current prices of low starting price auctions are still lower than that of high
starting price ones.
Unobserved heterogeneity
The first alternative explanation we discuss is the possibility that bidders prefer low starting price
auctions because they offer unobservably better products or are offered by unobservably better sellers.
We present five arguments against this alternative explanation.
(i) Lack of ex-ante candidates for correlates: We intentionally selected DVD movies as the
product for our study because we wanted to analyze goods that were highly standardized. Once the movie
title, new vs. used, reputation of the seller, experience of the seller, shipping charges and whether the
sellers is a store are controlled for, no obvious relevant attribute (likely to be correlated with starting
price) seems to remain unobserved.
(ii) Counterintuitive unobserved correlation: in order for unobserved heterogeneity to explain our
results, lower starting price auctions (or sellers of) would need to be unobservably superior to higher
starting price ones. As we mentioned earlier, standard auction models predict that sellers set starting
prices at or above the opportunity cost of the item they offer, however, and hence, according to existing
rational models, failing to control for unobserved heterogeneity should bias our estimates towards finding
a preference for higher starting price auctions.
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(iii) Observable heterogeneity does not alter estimates: one way to assess the potential impact of
unobserved heterogeneity on our parameter estimates for starting price is to examine the impact of
excluding observed heterogeneity. If unobservable heterogeneity is behind our findings, the point
estimates for starting price should be greatly influenced when observable heterogeneity is excluded.
This, however, is not the case. None of the regressions presented in tables 1-3 show noticeable changes
in the point estimate of the coefficient for starting price when observable heterogeneity is added to the
regression, suggesting that unobservable heterogeneity is an unlikely explanation for our findings.
(iv) Experienced bidders stay away from low starting price auctions: as was reported above,
experienced bidders are less likely to choose low starting price auctions, conditional on current price, that
inexperienced bidders (see Figure 6). The fact that experience diminishes bidders’ tendencies to choose
low starting price auctions is consistent with such tendency being caused by a mistake (non-rational
herding) but not with the alternative explanation based on unobservable higher quality. Why would
experienced bidders shy away from bidding on superior items?
(v) Equal expected revenues for auctions with low and high starting prices: Finally, in a
competitive market such as eBay, superior items and/or superior sellers of items should obtain higher
revenues. The fact that revenues are nearly identical for auctions starting at $1 and $10 suggests that that
the quality of items listed at $1 and $10 must also be virtually identical.
In sum, there is no evidence that points to low starting price auctions being of higher quality than
high starting price auctions.
Attachment
The second alternative explanation we consider is that bidders who bid early-on on low starting
price auctions (when the price is still low) become more determined to win the item than if they had not
placed an early bid. This could be the result of selective attention to auctions one has already bid on, of
the excitement or arousal generated by the bidding process itself (Ariely & Simonson, 2003; Haubl &
Popkowski Leszczyc, 2003a; Ku, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2005), or of a pseudo-endowment effect
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(Dodonova & Khoroshilov, 2004; Heyman, Orhun, & Ariely, 2004). We refer to this general explanation
as attachment.
To assess how much of the increased preference for low starting price auctions can be explained
by attachment, we estimated the regression used for testing prediction 1 (i.e. bidder’s tendency to prefer
low starting price auctions, conditional on current price) excluding repeat bidders, i.e. not counting bids
by bidders who had already placed a bid on the auction as a new bid. If the impact of starting price was
solely due to attachment, the coefficient for starting price should no longer be significant once repeat
bidders are excluded, while –on the other extreme- if attachment plays no role at all, the point estimate
should remain unchanged. The relative drop in the coefficient of starting price, therefore, provides an
estimate of the relative importance of attachment (in our data).
The results from this regression are presented in the column 6 in Table 1; the point estimate for
starting price in this column, where repeat bidders are excluded, is virtually identical to the point estimate
in column 4, where they are included (β(column 4)=-1.54 and β(column 6)=-1.56). Although this does not
necessarily rule out attachment as a real phenomenon, it suggests it is not behind the reported tendency
for preferring low starting price auctions.
Distracted Snipers
Various studies have shown that bidders tend to place their bids during the last few minutes of an
auction (for a review see section 3 in Bajari and Hortacsu, 2004) . If last minute bidders (often referred to
as snipers) choose early-on which auctions to snipe on, perhaps based on the current price at that time,
and they do not update their decisions as prices increase, low starting price auctions may be preferred by
bidders because their low starting prices act as bait for snipers. Under the distracted sniper explanation,
winners of low starting price auctions are not being attracted by the high number of bids that the auction
accumulates through time, but rather, they made up their minds even before these bids arrived. One
might argue, however, that if snipers are strategic in their bidding behavior, it is unlikely that they will not
be strategic also in their decisions of which auction to participate in. Furthermore, when placing a bid on
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eBay, a bidder is shown the current price, and hence it would be technically difficult to place a bid
without being aware of the current price.
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile considering this explanation because of how prevalent sniping is in
online bidding. A logical consequence of this account of the results is that low starting price auctions
should receive more last minute bids. Figure 7 plots the proportion of last bids arriving within 5, 60 and
180 minutes of the end of the auction. Although there is plenty of last minute bidding in DVD movies,
there is no evidence of a higher rate of last minute bidding in low starting price auctions.
***Figure 7 ***
6. Conclusions
In this paper we show that online bidders have a biased preference for auctions with more bids
even if these bids are non-diagnostic of quality, that such bias creates an incentive for sellers to lower the
starting price of their auctions, that enough sellers do so that their side of the market is in equilibrium but
that despite such market forces bidders continue engaging in non-rational herding, being less likely to win
auctions and having a higher expected final price if they do win. These findings contribute to various
literatures, including herding, auctions and industrial organization in general.
In terms of the auctions literature, our findings provide an explanation for sellers’ marked
tendency to start their auction well below the opportunity cost of the items they offer, contrary to standard
auction models. Also, this paper improves our understanding of how bidders choose where to place their
bids when they have many parallel auctions offering similar or identical products, contributing to the
recent interest in auctions where bidders endogenously decide whether to participate (see e.g. Bajari &
Hortacsu, 2003; Reiley, 2005; Zeithammer, Forthcoming).
With regards to the herding literature, ours is among the first papers to study herding utilizing
individual level data from the field. More importantly, it is the first to propose a specific testable (and
tested) alternative to rational information-based herding models that assume perfect Bayesian updating
based on observed behaviors. Standard herding models assume that observers make unbiased inferences
from the actions they observe.
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The fact that people misattribute causality behind the observed actions of others, however, is such
a robust finding in social psychology that it has been termed the “fundamental attribution error.” It seems
likely that herding models which take such robust and systematic deviations into account would be able to
make more accurate predictions of herding in the real world, as we do in this paper.
We believe that non-rational herding as a consequence of overattributing causality to focal causes
is likely to occur in other domains where decisions are based, at least partially, upon inferences agents
make from observed behavior. When hiring, for example, employers assessing the ability of an applicant
may overattribute to the focal target of their evaluation (the applicant) the quality of the previous position
held by her, and underweight the role played by non-focal causes, such as job market conditions when the
previous job was obtained, leading workers who happen to obtain their first job under favorable job
market conditions to continue receiving the benefits of such conditions, long after they cease to be
present. Devereux (2002) and Oyer (2006) provide evidence consistent with this prediction
Another example consists of the inference problem firms face when attempting to understand the
driver of price changes in the markets where they participate. Lucas (1973) seminal paper proposed that
inflation can affect real output if producers confuse changes in the aggregate level of prices with changes
in relative prices. One possible mechanism for this type of error is that producers over-attribute to focal
targets (their own business) the increase in the prices of their product, rather than to the true yet nonsalient cause (excessive printing of money).
Finally, in terms of industrial organization, our results highlight that market forces can eliminate
rents associated with exploiting biases without eliminating the biases themselves. This means that (i)
behavioral biases can be observed even after market forces have played their part, and that (ii) in order to
understand the rational behavior of firms one must first understand the not necessarily rational behavior
of consumers they are responding to.
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Table 1. The Effect of Starting Price on Probability of Receiving Additional Bids (Logistic Regression with clustered standard errors)
Dependent Variable: 1 if at least one more bid was placed, 0 if last bid.

Intercept

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Number of

Controls

adds movie

adds seller

Only bids

Same as (4)

existing bids

for auction

controls

controls

placed once

excluding

as key predictor

variables only

price>=$10

repeat bidders

-4.027***

0.121

1.054

0.385

-2.293

-0.145

(0.671)

(1.036)

(0.997)

(6.712)

(1.477)

--

-0.155***

-0.165***

-0.154***

-0.107***

-0.156***

--

(0.006)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.009)

0.278***

0.273***

0.240***

-0.160***

(0.010)

(0.031)

(0.865)

Starting Price
log(Minutes left on the auction)

0.392***

0.303***

(0.010)

(0.008)

(0.009)

(0.009)

Shipping Charges

-0.113***

0.044**

-0.076***

-0.085***

(0.027)

(0.022)

(0.026)

(0.027)

"New" Movie Dummy
log(Seller Rating)
log(Seller Experience)
eBay Store Dummy
Log(Number of existing bids)

0.235***

--

0.176***

0.138***

(0.051)

--

(0.050)

(0.052)

0.009
(0.026)

0.069
(0.054)

0.346***
(0.011)

0.239***
(0.064)

0.066***

--

--

0.138***

0.130***

0.193***

(0.020)

--

--

(0.021)

(0.024)

(0.025)

0.007

--

--

-0.027**

-0.027*

-0.033**

(0.013)

--

--

(0.013)

(0.016)

(0.016)

-0.158

--

--

-0.221**

-0.313***

-0.290**

(0.101)

--

--

(0.102)

(0.096)

(0.117)

1.515***

--

--

--

--

--

(0.039)

--

--

--

--

--

Movie title fixed-effects (df=53)

YES

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

Current price dummies (df=21)a
Pseudo R-Square

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

0.246

0.316

0.320

0.175

0.360

26,580

26,580

26,580

26,580

10,127

13,826

Number of observations

Notes: Standard errors, clustered by auction, reported in parenthesis below parameter estimates.
Column 5's standard errors are not clustered due to the reduced number of observations per auction
*,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
a

Current price is controlled for with dummies for rounded dollar amounts (between $0 and $20), avoiding functional form assumptions.
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Table 2. Effects of starting price on probability that bid of given $ amount wins the auction (logistic regression)
Dependent Variable: 1 if bid won the auction, 0 otherwise

(1)
No controls

(2)

(3)

(4)

With Movie

With Seller

Only bids

Controls

Controls

for $10 or
more

Intercept
Starting Price
log(minutes left in auction when bid is placed)
Shipping Charges

2.510**

3.107**

3.464**

(1.046)

2.003*

(0.892)

(0.891)

(1.277)

0.083**

0.104**

0.097**

0.077**

(0.006)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.007)

-0.337**

-0.298**

-0.293**

-0.105*

(0.008)

(0.009)

(0.009)

(0.055)

0.111**

0.105**

-0.243**

(0.026)

(0.027)

(0.010)

0.006
(0.022)

"New" Movie Dummy

--

-0.236**

-0.197**

--

(0.051)

(0.052)

(0.027)

0.038

--

-0.046**

-0.032

log(Seller Rating)

---

--

(0.020)

(0.024)

log(Seller Experience)

--

--

-0.037**

-0.038**

--

--

(0.013)

(0.015)

--

--

0.079

--

--

(0.095)

(0.100)

Dollar amount of bid dummies (df=21) a
Movie Title Fixed Effects (df=53)

YES

YES

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

YES

Pseudo R-Square

0.257

0.304

0.306

0.157

Number of observations

25,368

25,368

25,368

9,883

eBay Store Dummy

0.170*

Clustered (by auction) standard errors reported below parameter estimates.
Column 4's standard errors are not clustered due to the reduced number of observations per auction
*,** significant at the 5% and 1% respectively
a

Bid Amount is controlled for with dummies for rounded dollar amounts (between $0 and $20), avoiding functional form
assumptions. Results with linear controls are repoted in footnotes.

b

Sample size is reduced when controlling for shipping because not all sellers report their shipping charges to eBay.
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Table 3. Effects of starting price on price paid by winner (OLS)
Dependent variable: final price price paid (in $)

Intercept

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Only

Adds movie

Adds Seller

Adds

bid controls

controls

controls

shipping

0.561**

0.490**

chargesa
0.638**

(0.079)

(0.087)

(0.115)

0.053
(0.049)

Starting Price
Dollar amount of bid
log (minutes left in auction when bid was placed)
Current price when bid was placed
"New" Movie Dummy
log(Seller Experience)
log(Seller Rating)
eBay Store Dummy
Shipping Charges
Movie Title Fixed Effects (df=53)

-0.025**

-0.029**

-0.028**

-0.029**

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.004)

0.519**

0.500**

0.498**

0.497**

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.007)

0.096**

0.090**

0.089**

0.087**

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.006)

0.445**

0.417**

0.414**

0.412**

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.008)

--

0.093**

0.092**

0.083**

--

(0.025)

(0.025)

(0.030)

--

--

0.011

-0.001

--

--

(0.010)

(0.012)

--

--

0.011

--

--

(0.007)

(0.008)

--

--

0.049**

0.054**

--

--

(0.051)

(0.056)

--

--

--

-0.040**

--

--

--

(0.014)

0.026**

NO

YES

YES

YES

R-Square

0.899

0.903

0.903

0.903

Number of observations

6,333

6,333

6,333

4,572

Standard errors reported below parameter estimates.
*,** significant at 5% and 1% respectively
a

Sample size is reduced when controlling for shipping because not all sellers report their shipping charges to eBay.
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Figure 6.
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